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Void for Vagueness: State Statutes
Proscribing Conduct Only
For a Juvenile

EDWARD R. ROYBAL*

Mark Twain, himself no admirer of the law process,' once wrote:
"A man should not be without morals; it is better to have bad
morals than none at all. ' 2 Probably, had he the opportunity,
Twain would not have penned a current California statute relating
to juvenile court jurisdiction in that state, to wit:
Any person under the age of 21 years . .. who from any cause
is in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life,
court which may adjudge
is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile
3
such person to be a ward of the court.

Neither, perhaps, would he have cared to commit juveniles in Con* Member of Congress; elected to the 88th through 92d Congresses.
California, Thirtieth District. University of California at Los Angeles;
Southwestern University in Los Angeles; Pacific State University (honorary
LL.D.).
1. "To succeed in the other trades, a capacity must be shown; in the
law, concealment of it will do." PUDDENHEAD WILSON'S NEW CALENDER.
S. CLEMENS, FOLLOWING THE EQUATOR,

331 (1971).

2. S. CLEMENS, MARK TWAIN'S NOTEBOOK, 237 (A. Paine ed. 1935).
3. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE sec. 601 (West 1966), as amended, (West
1972). Section 601 was amended from "21 years" to "18 years." See also
WASH. REV. CODE sec. 13.04.010 (1962).

necticut

4

and Indiana 5 to the juvenile court for engaging "in inde-

cent or immoral conduct."6 Similar language is employed by practically every state to define that conduct on the part of minors
which invokes juvenile court jurisdiction: "habitually so deporting himself as to injure or endanger the morals or health of himself or others" ;7 "associates with vagrant, vicious or immoral persons" ;8 "growing up in idleness and crime"; 9 "whose occupation,
behavior, age, condition, environment, or associations are such as
to injure or endanger his health, morals and general welfare or
that of others"; 10 "is incorrigible, ungovernable";" "behaving in
an incorrigible or indecent and lascivious manner

. . .

living in cir-

cumstances of manifest danger of falling into habits of vice or immorality;' 2 "who is growing up in circumstances exposing him to
lead an immoral, vicious or criminal life"; 13 "who is leading an immoral life . . . who habitually idles away his or her time";14 "who,
4.

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. sec. 17-53 (Supp. 1972).
5. IND. ANN. STAT. sec. 93204 (Supp. 1972).
6. Id. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. sec. 17-53 (Supp. 1972).
7. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. sec. 8-201 (Supp. Pamph. 1972); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, sec. 901 (1953); D.C. CODE sec. 11-1551 (1967); IOWA CODE
ANN. sec. 232.2 (1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, sec. 70-1 (Supp. 1971);
MINN. STAT. ANN. sec. 260.015 (1971); Miss. CODE ANN. sec. 7185-02 (Supp.
1971); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. sec. 10-602 (1968); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. sec.
169:2 (Supp. 1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. sec. 13-8-26 (1968); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, sec. 243 (1965); S.C. CODE ANN. sec. 15-1103 (1962); TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. art. 2338-1, sec. 3 (1971); W. VA. CODE ANN. sec. 49-1-4 (1966); Wis.
STAT. sec. 48.12 (Supp. 1972).
8. ALASKA STAT. sec. 47.10.010 (1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, sec. 901
(1953); D.C. CODE ANN. sec. 11-1551 (1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. sec. 39.01
(Supp. 1972); GA. CODE ANN. sec. 24-2401 (1971); IND. ANN. STAT. sec.
9-3204 (Supp. 1972); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, sec. 52, (1969); MICH.
COMP. LAWS sec. 712A.2 (1968); N.J. REV. STAT. sec. 2A:4-14 (Supp. 1972);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. sec. 2151.022 (Page Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. tit. 11,
sec. 243 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. sec. 14-1-3 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN.
sec. 15-1103 (1962); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 2338-1, sec. 3 (1971); W. VA.
CODE ANN. sec. 49-1-4 (1966).
9. FLA. STAT. ANN. sec. 39.01 (Supp. 1972); N.J. REV. STAT. sec. 2A: 4-

14 (Supp. 1972).
10. GA. CODE ANN. sec. 24-2408 (1971); ALASKA STAT. sec. 47.10.010
(1971); HAWAII REV. STAT. sec. 571-11 (1968) as amended Act 81, sec. 1
(1970) Hawaii Acts 146; LA. REV. STAT. sec. 13:1570 (1968); MIss. CODE
ANN. sec. 7185-02 (Supp. 1971); Mo. REV. STAT. sec. 211.031 (1962); NEv.
REV. STAT. sec. 62.040 (1971); ORE. REV. STAT. sec. 419.476 (1971); UTAH
CODE ANN. sec. 55-10-77 (Supp. 1971); VA. CODE ANN. sec. 16.1-158 (Supp.
1972).
11. IND. ANN. STAT. sec. 9-3204 (Supp. 1972); N.J. REV. STAT. sec. 2A:
4-14 (Supp. 1972); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT sec. 712 (Supp. 1972); S.C. CODE
ANN. sec. 15-1103 (1962); VA. CODE ANN. sec. 16.1-158 (Supp. 1972); WASH.
REV. CODE sec. 13.04.010 (1962); W. VA. CODE ANN. sec. 49-1-4 (1966).
12. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, sec. 2552 (1965).
13. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, sec. 52 (1969).
14. MICH. COMP. LAWS sec. 712A.2 (1968).
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by reason of being habitually wayward or habitually disobedient,
15
becomes an incorrigible or uncontrollable child.'
To invoke Twain is not, of course, to suggest that he should have
authored this country's juvenile laws. Neither, of hopefully equal
obviousness, is it to imply a virtue in immoral behavior, however
it be defined. Rather, Twain's observation aids the introduction of
an issue of constitutional import: the questionable validity of current state statutes which proscribe behavior which is illegal only
for juveniles; behavior, often couched in vague and all-encompassing moral terms, which, if engaged in by an adult, would not be
prohibited.
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the problem of vaguely
written statutes on numerous occasions.' 0 The general rule is that
a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the
first essential of due process of law.' 7 Inasmuch as the U.S. Supreme Court decision in In re Gault' s has largely vitiated the notion that juvenile proceedings are beyond the application of due
process guarantees, it is wholly reasonable to expect that due process now requires that juveniles not be forced to defend against
vaguely written laws.
Such statutes as those mentioned above, while the subject of both
recent judicial rejection on vagueness grounds 9 as well as serious
15. MISS.

CODE ANN.

sec. 7185-02 (Supp. 1971).

16. See generally Amsterdam, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).

17. Connally v. Gen. Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
18. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Historically, juvenile courts have been classified
as civil courts. As such, they often did away with many of the procedures
of ordinary criminal cases. In Gault, however, the Supreme Court ruled
that a child alleged to be a juvenile delinquent had at least the following
rights: (1) right to notice of the charges in time to prepare for trial; (2)
right to counsel; (3) right to confrontation and cross examination; and (4)
privilege against self incrimination, at least in court. See M. MIDONICK,
CHILDREN,

PARENTS

AND

THE COURTS:

ABILITY AND NEGLECT 13 (1972).

JUVENILE

DELINQUENCY,

UNGOVERN-

See also 387 U.S. at 17.

19. Gonzalez v. Mailliard, No. 50424 SAW (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1971);
appeal docketed, No. 70-120; Apr. 9, 1971; Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp.
371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd 406 U.S. 913 (1972). The New York Times has
reported a federal suit challenging as "hopelessly vague" a New York statute, N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT sec. 712(b), (McKinney, 1963), which defines

inquiry for the purpose of reform, 20 have traditionally been upheld
24
23
22
by the courts. 21 State courts in Alaska, New Jersey, Texas,
26
25
and most recently, New York 27
Massachusetts
Connecticut,
have upheld them against vagueness attacks. The Texas case 28 is
illustrative of the typical response to claims that many juvenile behavior laws are phrased in such vague moral terms as to be meaningless and constitutionally infirm:
The relatively comprehensive word 'morals' is one which conveys concrete impressions to the ordinary person. Such word is in
constant use in popular parlance, and this word or words of similar
import are used in
the statutes of most states to define behavior
29
illegal for a child.
a person in need of supervision as a boy under 16 or a girl under 18 "who
is incorribigle, ungovernable or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control of parent or other lawful authority." The suit was filed by the
Children's Rights Project of the New York Civil Liberties Union, the Legal
Aid Society and the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation. See N.Y.
Times, Feb. 2, 1973, at 14, col. 1.
20. The NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL recently reported the formation of a
national commission to develop the first comprehensive proposed standards
of juvenile justice in the country. "The aim of the commission will be to
improve the 'deplorable and deteriorating' system of dealing with youth
in criminal and non-criminal behavior . . ." See N.Y.L. JOURNAL, Feb. 13,
1973, at 1, col. 6.
21. "Although no court decision has yet struck down a juvenile court
act for vagueness, a number of courts have considered such a challenge."
Midonick, supra note 18 at 13. But see State v. Gallegos, 384 P.2d 967 (Sup.
Ct. Wyo. 1963).
22. United States v. Meyers, 143 F. Supp. 1 (D.Alaska 1956) upholding
"contributing to the delinquency of a child" where the court noted that the
second paragraph of the statute in question made "perfectly clear" what was
intended to be prohibited by the statute. The second paragraph read as
follows: "For the purposes of this Act any child under the age of eighteen
years ... who is in danger of becoming or remaining a person who leads an
idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral life. . . or who is guilty of or takes part in
or submits to any immoral act or conduct ... shall be deemed a delinquent
child." 143 F. Supp. at 3.
23. State v. L.N., 109 N.J. Super. 278, 263 A.2d 150 (1970), aff'd, 57
N.J. 165, 270 A.2d 409 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1009 (1971) upholding
"growing up in idleness or delinquency" and "deportment endangering the
morals, health or general welfare of said child."
24. E.S.G. v. State, 447 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1969) cert. denied, 398 U.S. 956 (1970) upholding "habitually so deports himself as to
injure or endanger the morals or health of himself or others."
25. State v. Mattiello, 4 Conn. Cir. 55, 225 A.2d 507 (App. Div. 1966),
cert. denied, 154 Conn. 737, 225 A.2d 201 (1966) prob. juris. noted, 391 U.S.
963 (1968), appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 209 (1969), upholding "habits of
vice" and "vicious life."
26. Commonwealth v. 'Brasher, 270 N.E. 389 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. 1971),
upholding "stubborn child."
27. A. v. City of New York, 31 N.Y.2d 83, 286 N.E.2d 432 (1972), upholding "habitual truant," "incorrigible," "ungovernable," "habitually disobedient and beyond ... lawful control."

28. E.S.G. v. State, supra note 24.
29. Id. at 226. With all due respect, "concrete impressions," "constant
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Legislative justification for such broad statutes most often rests on
the premise that early intervention, allowing the reformative influence of juvenile courts and training schools to reach the delinquent before he commits more serious crimes, is a desirable
end, 0 an understandable conclusion in light of the polestar which
the States have followed since juvenile court acts were begun: the
3 1
doctrine of parens patriae.
Notwithstanding the "highest motives and most enlightened impulses" 32 of those who author the juvenile laws of the several
states, it is submitted that contemporary juvenile behavorial laws
are impermissibly vague and violative of due process. Similarly
written laws, when applicable to adults, have been struck down.83
It must necessarily follow that if we are going to endow juveniles
with due process rights to hearing, counsel, notice, confrontation
and freedom from self-incrimination,3 4 their meaningful applicause in popular parlance" and the fact that sister states employ equally
vague statutes are subjective justifications of an already subjective law.
It is of no utility to use imprecision to justify an imprecise law.
30. See Rosenheim, Perennial Problems in the Juvenile Court, in Jus12 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962).
31. The Latin phrase, parens patriae, has for many years been used to

TICE FOR THE CHILD

epitomize the legal and social philosophy underlying the juvenile court.
Parens patriae describes a doctrine of the English court of chancery by
which the King, through his chancellors assumed the general protection of

all infants in the realm. The theory was that the sovereign, as pater
patriae, possessed an obligation to oversee the welfare of the children in
his kingdom who, because of the frailties intrinsic to their minority, might
be abused, neglected, or abandoned by their parents or other guardians.
The King, through his court of chancery, could thereby step in and provide
the requisite parental protection and care. Ketcham, The Unfulfilled
Promise ,of the American Juvenile Court, in JUSTIcE FOR THE CHILD 22 (M.
Rosenheim ed. 1962).
32. Speaking of the juvenile process in this country, some of whose
constitutional deficiencies it was the Court's intent to correct, the Supreme
Court in Gault noted: "Accordingly, the highest motives and most enlightened impulses led to a peculiar system for juveniles, unknown to our law
in any comparable context." 387 U.S. at 17.
33. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969),
striking down vagrancy statute proscribing an "idle, immoral or profligate
life." Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897 (D. Colo. 1969), striking down
vagrancy statute proscribing an "idle, immoral or profligate course of life."
Ricks v. District of Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1968), striking down
vagrancy statute proscribing "leading an immoral and profligate life."
Cf. Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Palmer v. City of Euclid,
402 U.S. 544 (1971).
34. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).

tion demands that a juvenile not be made to defend against vague
laws.
In Gonzalez v. Mailliard35 a federal district court judge struck
down a California statute which permitted the juvenile court to
adjudge certain persons under 21 as wards of the court, to wit
those:
...who from any cause is in danger of leading an idle, dissolute,
36
lewd or immoral life.

The Gonzalez decision came about as a result of a suit seeking a
declaratory judgment that the California statute was unconstitutionally vague. The plaintiffs, nine juveniles, of whom all, on a
prior occasion, had been arrested pursuant to the statute, sought,
additionally, an injunction barring further enforcement of the Act.
The court appearing to emphasize the impermissibly broad scope
of conduct to which the statute apparently applied, quoted from
prior California cases describing conduct which justifies making a
juvenile a ward of the state: conduct which is hostile to the welfare of the general public and contrary to good morals; conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, dissoluteness; willful, flagrant or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to the opinions of the respectable members
of the community, and as an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and the public welfare; showing that he or she is indifferent to
moral restraint, given over to dissipation or vicious courses; not occupied or employed; to loaf or dissipate ones time; loose in morals
and conduct; wanton, lewd, debauched; inimical to good order and
contra bonos mores; any practice, the tendency of which, as shown
by experience, is to weaken or corrupt the morals of those who follow it; loosed from restraint, unashamed, lawless, loose in morals
and conduct, recklessly abandoned to sensual pleasures, profligate,
37
wanton, lewd, debauched.
The court was impressed with the fact that adult vagrancy statutes, employing language similar to the California law, had been
struck down on a number of occasions. The court was equally impressed with what it saw as "the seriousness of the deprivation of
freedom" which was possible under the statute.38
35. No. 504 24 SAW (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 1971), appeal docketed, No.
70-120; Apr. 9, 1971. The decision is unreported and is reproduced as an
appendix to this article.
36.

CAL. WELF.

& INST.

CODE

sec. 601 (West 1966).

See Appendix i-ii.

37. Case citations are collected in decision footnotes at Appendix vii.
38. Notwithstanding defendants' claim that the California statute was
"civil" in nature, the court chose to view it as a "penal" provision "since it
sanctions misconduct against the public order with deprivation of liberty."
Appendix viii, at n.9.
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Beyond these considerations, however, the court addressed the
damaging effect which a vague statute would work on the Gaultgiven due process rights89 to which a juvenile is entitled. Noting
that "a central infirmity of a vague statute is that its vagueness
makes other due process guarantees meaningless ' 40 the court
41
quoted from Justice Black's opinion in Giaccio v. Pennsylvania,
where the Supreme Court found a statute unconstitutionally vague
which imposed costs of prosecution upon a criminal defendant
42
guilty of "some misconduct":
It would be difficult if not impossible for a person to prepare a

defense against such general
abstract charges as 'misconduct' or
'reprehensible conduct.' 4 3
The Court in Gonzalez believed that a sufficient analogy between
the case before it and that in Giaccio existed. Certainly, the court
believed, it is no easier to defend against "leading an idle, dissolute,
lewd or immoral life" than "misconduct" or "reprehensible misconduct" which was at issue in Giaccio. And what legal utility is there
in allowing certain due process rights to juveniles if they are all
for naught in light of a charge under a vague statute?:
Of what possible utility is notice of charges when the charge is

merely that one is 'dissolute'? What use is counsel when it is impossible to know what
44 type of evidence is relevant to rebuttal of
the prosecution case?
In light of the Supreme Court decision in In re Winship, 45 holding that a juvenile is entitled to the "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard, at least when he is charged with conduct amounting to an adult crime, the Gonzalez court took cognizance of possible mischief on the part of juvenile authorities when enforcing
their juvenile laws. It is not wholly beyond possibility, the court
implied, that if the police or probation officers do not have sufficient evidence to prove the commission of a crime by a juvenile
beyond a reasonable doubt, they can change the charge "and prove
a potentially immoral conduct of life."'46 Thus it is obvious, though
39.
40.
41.
42.

See note 18 supra.
See Appendix xi.
382 U.S. 399 (1966).
See Appendix xii.

43. Id.
44. See Appendix xii-xiii.
45. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

46. See Appendix xiii.

the court did not state the conclusion, that using such open-ended
statutes, authorities may effect "criminal" convictions by use of a
"icivil" (as at least it was traditionally known) process. Even if
the "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" standard were applied to
the noncriminal charge of "leading an immoral life," the court
surmised, the substance of the offense is so broadly defined that
the procedural safeguard of such a standard of proof becomes
meaningless. The court:
Standards of proof depend on standards of relevance and probativeness, and these are precluded when the substantive offense
covers the entire moral dimension of one's life. 47

A three-judge federal court in New York, in striking down portions of that state's Wayward Minor statute 48 found the terms
"morally depraved" and "in danger of becoming morally depraved"
"far beyond the bounds of permissible ambiguity. '49 In doing so
the court articulated a conclusion that even common sense would
seem to dictate:
The concept of morality has occupied men of extraordinary in-

telligence for centuries, without notable progress (among even
50
philosophers and theologians) toward a common understanding.

47. See Appendix xiv. Gonzales is now before the Supreme Court
where, possibly, the question will be decided. It must be remembered,
however, that the court abruptly terminated review of an earlier case raising silimar issues. See State v. Mattiello, supra at note 25. For a discussion of Mattiello see comment, Statutory Vagueness in Juvenile Law: The
Supreme Court and Mattiello v. Commissioner, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 143
(1969).
48. Former N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 913-a(5) (6). Now see N.Y. FAMILY COURT ACT § 712(b) (McKinney, Supp. 1972) which withstood an attack
on vagueness grounds in A. v. City of New York, 31 N.Y.2d 83, 286 N.E.2d
432 (1972). See note 27, supra. While upholding the statute on vagueness
grounds, the court struck that portion of the statute down as a violation of
equal protection which differentiated between males under 16 and females
under 18.
49. Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) aff'd 406 U.S.
913 (1972).
50. 336 F. Supp. at 374. With this articulation, the issue herein reaches
its zenith of visibility. Of course we must all agree that we should live a
"good" life and be "moral" and avoid "evil." But to legislate these notions
in the abstract is beyond constitutional sanction. To simply regulate juvenile behavior in such vague terms leads to the following confusing description of expected behavior on the part of juveniles in Kansas. The description appears intended to assist juveniles in gauging their conduct so as to
avoid conflict with Kansas' law concerning juvenile behavior:
Acting in any way that goes against what most of the lawabiding
people in your community think is right and proper is usually considered indecent or immoral conduct and is against the law. The
court (judge), who is elected by your parents, decides what is
indecent or immoral because he understands the thinking of most
of the people in your community.
Anyone who conducts himself according to the moral standards
of society usually leads a much happier, more meaningful, and
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The court went beyond consideration of the constitutional infirmity
of vagueness to what it believed to be the impermissible punishment of a condition or status of immorality which the New York
statute worked on those subject to its enforcement. Referring to
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Robinson v. California,51 the
New York Court appeared to view the statute before it as penalizing a minor's condition, rather than any specific actions, similar
to the fated California statute in Robinson which punished the
status of narcotic addiction "whether or not he [the offender] has
ever used or possessed any narcotics within the State, and whether
52
or not he has been guilty of any antisocial behavior there."
It may be advanced that the statute in Gesicki is distinguishable
from the one in Gonzalez53 and those discussed earlier 54 for the
fact that the statute before the court was found to be "substantially
equivalent to a criminal statue. '5 5 Those convicted pursuant to
the statute were possibly subject to being incarcerated with adult
criminals; the statute was in the Criminal Code of the state; trials
thereunder were conducted in courts of general criminal jurisdiction; those juveniles convicted were not assured of treatment substantially distinguished from that accorded to criminals. However,
such a distinction only perpetuates a fallacious notion: that if we
really treat juveniles pursuant to civil (or at least not otherwise
identified as criminal) proceedings and incarcerate them in
"farms", "reformatories" or whatever surroundings (again, in facilities that are, at least, not otherwise identified as criminal) then
such treatment assumes a more acceptable air, one that does not require strict constitutional sanction. The fact is that however we
care to characterize our treatment of juveniles, they are being deprived of their liberty,56 a process which we must insure is done
more rewarding life.
Kansas State University, What is the Law for Juveniles? 4 (1971). One
certainly need not be a reform zealot to recognize the impossibility of measuring conduct that falls within the scope of such standards.
51. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
52. Id. at 666.

53. See Appendix i-ii.

54. See notes 3-5, 7-15 supra.
55. 336 F. Supp. at 379.
56. The Supreme Court in Gault, 387 U.S. 1, (1967), noted the fallacy
of the "civil-criminal" distinction: "For this purpose, at least, commitment
is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against one's will, whether
it is called 'criminal' or 'civil.' Id. at 50.

only pursuant to the requirements of the Constitution. "Fundamental fairness"5 7 demands that one of those requirements be that
juvenile statutes be written so as to comport with criteria of specificity as handed down by the Supreme Court 5 -not to conflict
with them.
Another danger is that of overreaching by authorities who assume jurisdiction over juveniles by vaguely written statutes. It is
not difficult to agree with Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency5 9
that such statutes
•. .establish the judge as arbiter not only of the behavior but also
of the morals of every child (and to a certain extent the parents
of every child) appearing before him [citation omitted]. The situation is ripe for overreaching, for imposition of the judge's own
code of youthful conduct. 60
The Task Force went so far as to recommend, in view of the "serious stigma and the uncertain gain accompanying official action" 61 that "serious consideration" be given to "complete elimination from the courts jurisdiction of conduct illegal only for a
child. '6 2 But there is at least a nugget of propriety and purpose,
perhaps, in maintaining an approach that seeks to assist and redirect children before more serious traits develop; an approach that
may very well be facilitated by a juvenile court equipped with
useful educational, medical, psychiatric or social services. 63 There
are sufficient statutory models that may prove workable. 64 But
57. The applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings is
fundamental fairness. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971).
58. See text to notes 16 & 17 supra.
59. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:

ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADJUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND

YOUTH CRIME (1967) [hereinafter cited as Task Force Report].
60. Id. at 25. It has been noted that "[t]he zealous court can in fact
intervene in any case in which the condition of the child, his parents, or his
neighborhood attracts the saolictude of its personel." Tappan, Juridical
and Administrative Approaches to Children with Problems, in JUSTICE FOR
THE CHILD 157 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962).
61. Task Force Report, supranote 59, at 27.
62. Id. Mr. Justice Fortas notion that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone," In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,

13 (1967), raises the question of whether punishing a juvenile for conduct
for which an adult is not punishable violates a juvenile's equal protection
rights. However, Gault is not without its limitations. See McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). No constitutional right to jury trial in

juvenile delinquency proceedings.
63. Midonick, supra note 18, at 14.
64. See Standard Juvenile Court Act in Eldefonso, Law Enforcement
and the Youthful Offender 451-481 (2d ed. 1973); Sheridan, U.S. Dep't

HEW, Childrens Bureau, Pub. No. 472, Legislative Guide for Drafting Family and Juvenile Court Acts (1969); NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMITTEE
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, Uniform Juvenile Court Act (1968).

[VOL. 1: 1, 1973]

Void Juvenile Statute
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

in any event, state legislators and the courts must insure, at the
very minimum, that juvenile behavioral statutes are written with
constitutional precision. It can and should be done. After all, as
noted by the court in Gonzalez, states have had "over 50 years of
experience with the juvenile court system and should by now be
able to give fair warning of the conduct which it wishes to single
out for treatment in confining state institutions."6' 5

65. See Appendix xi, at n.10.

Appendix, A

In the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California

No. 50424 SAW

Frank Gonzalez, through Maria Alvarez,
his Guardian ad Litem; et al., Plaintiffs,
VS.
J. W. Mailliard, III, President of the Police Commission of the
City and County of San Francisco, et al., Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
WEIGEL, J.

Plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment that a California juvenile
delinquency statute is unconstitutionally vague. The statute provides that "Any person under the age of 21 years who persistently
or habitually refuses to obey the reasonable and proper orders or
directions of his parents, guardian, custodian or school authorities,
or who is beyond the control of such person, or any person who is
a habitual truant from school within the meaning of any law of
this State, or who from any cause is in danger of leading an idle,
dissolute, lewd, or immoral life, is within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the
court." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE, § 601 (West 1966) (emphasis
added).
The facts giving rise to this lawsuit are as follows.
On October 9, 1968, two San Francisco policemen were dispatched
to investigate a report that a girl had been assaulted. The victim
told the officers that she had been assaulted by about fifteen persons, a mixed group of whites and Latins who were members of the
"24th Street Gang" that frequented the corner of Folsom and 24th
Street. She knew the names of only three of her attackers. The
officers then proceeded to 2400 Folsom Street where they saw eight
boys they believed to be part of the "24th Street Gang". They arrested all eight on the grounds that they were in "danger of leading
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a lewd and dangerous life." While the officers were making the
arrests, two suspects named by the victim approached and were
also placed in custody. All ten persons were then booked for violating the juvenile delinquency statute and on suspicion of robbery. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 1966); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 211 (West 1970). All charges against the ten youths were later
dropped.
Nine of these ten persons filed this complaint on their own behalf
and on behalf of all persons threatened by continued enforcement
of the statute. They named as defendants the arresting officers,
members of the city's Police Commission, and the then Chief of
Police. They sought as relief a declaratory judgment that § 601 is
unconstitutional, a permanent injunction against arrests under
§ 601, damages from the individual police officers, and an order expunging their records of arrests under § 601. Because of the constitutional challenge to a state statute, a three-judge court was
convened. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1964).
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment. They argued that there was probable cause for the
arrests on suspicion of robbery and that therefore the Court need
not consider the arrests under § 601. In an order dated April 10,
1970, this three-judge court granted the defendants' motion with
respect to the two plaintiffs named by the victim, but denied it
with respect to the other plaintiffs. Plaintiffs then filed a motion
for partial summary judgment on the issue of the constitutionality
of the statute. There are no relevant facts in dispute on the issues
raised. Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and the
unresolved issues in defendants' motion to dismiss are now ripe for
decision.
MOTION TO Dismiss

Defendants' remaining preliminary arguments are that the controversy between plaintiffs and defendants is moot, and that even if
it is not moot, this federal court should abstain from ruling on the
constitutionality of the state statute.
Mootness
Defendants rest their mootness argument on the fact that all
charges against plaintiffs under § 601 had been dismissed before this
lawsuit was filed. But plaintiffs request relief to which they still
may be entitled and which depends on a decision as to the constitutionality of § 601. A declaration that this statute is unconstitutional should entitle plaintiffs to have the arrest record expunged.
"An unconstitutional act is not a law; .. .it imposes no duties;

. ..it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had
never been passed." Norton v. Shelby Co., 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886).

If this statute is unconstitutional on the grounds suggested by
plaintiffs, it would be inappropriate to allow the stigma to remain.
Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D. No. Car. 1969) (3
Judge Court), app. pend., Docket No. 102, 39 U.S.L.W. 3020
(U.S.S.C., Filed 3/3/70). Cf. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376
(1879).
Plaintiffs also charge two 'ofthe defendants with "wilfully, knowingly and purposely and with the specific intent to deprive plaintiffs" of first amendment rights, engaging in a systematic pattern
of "intimidation and humiliation." Complaint, paragraph XIX.
Their claim, simply stated, is that defendants were aware of the
vague nature of the statute, and used its breadth to intentionally
infringe on plaintiffs' right of association and assembly. Such an
argument is an extension of Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), but
it is nonetheless tenable, and depends on a prior determination of
unconstitutionality. If plaintiffs succeed, they will be entitled to
money damages. See Pierson v. Ray, supra; Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961). There is, therefore, a present controversy on this
issue.
The Court also notes, in denying the 'defense of mootness, that
the named plaintiffs and the plaintiff class face continued use of
the statute against them. Plaintiffs and their class should not be
required to violate the statute in order to raise its constitutionality, especially since they are threatened with its use on a daily basis. Compare Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958), with Golden v.
Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969).
Abstention
The defendants also urge this Court to escape from the task of
deciding this case by applying the doctrine of federal abstention.
With respect to the claim for declaratory relief, as contrasted to injunctive relief, "[t] he judge-made doctrine of abstention, first fashioned in 1941 in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496,
sanctions such escape only in narrowly limited 'special circumstances.'" Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967). Compare
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (injunctive relief). This
Court has not been presented any "special circumstance" which
would justify abstention. It is true that one "special circumstance"
justifying abstention is the "susceptibility of a state statute to a
construction by the state courts that would avoid or modify the
constitutional question."

Zwickler at 249, citing Harrison

v.

NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959). However California courts have repeatedly interpreted § 601 and given the terms under consideration
here a broad reading. See infra. In light of these decisions and the
long period of time for which the juvenile delinquency statute has
been in existence, the Court does not believe that justice would be
served by sending plaintiffs back to the state courts for yet another
state interpretation. See generally, Klim v. Jones, No. 52332 GSL
(N.D. Cal. July 17, 1970); Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897,
900-02 (D. Colo. 1969) (three-judge court).
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PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The argument of the plaintiffs centers upon the vagueness of the
words, "in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral

life."

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE

§ 601 (West, 1966). This Court must,

of course, consider the statute as interpreted by the state courts.
The state courts have constructed "idle, lewd, dissolute or immoral" by reference to California decisions construing those terms
in the context of adult crimes. In re Daniel R, 275 Cal. App. 2d
749, 79 Cal. Rptr. 247 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969). These cases make
it clear that the words are not used restrictively, but rather used
in their ordinary sense. In a jury trial for having contributed to the
delinquency of a minor (an adult crime incorporating the § 601 language by reference), no definition of the terms, nor limiting instruction need be given to the jury. People v. Lowell, 77 Cal. App.
2d 341, 347-48, 175 P.2d 846 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1946). See People v.
Deibert, 117 Cal. App. 2d 410, 256 P.2d 355 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
Judicial definitions of the terms indicate the breadth of the conduct that might be covered. According to California cases set out
in the margin, a juvenile may be declared a ward of the court if
he or she commits conduct which is: "hostile to the welfare of the
general public and contrary to good morals";' or "inconsistent
with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity,
dissoluteness; or as willful, flagrant or shameless conduct showing
moral indifference to the opinions of respectable members of the
community, and as an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and
the public welfare"; 2 or showing that he or she is "indifferent to
moral restraint, given over to dissipation or vicious courses; 3 or
"not occupied or employed; to loaf or dissipate one's time"; 4 or
"loose in morals and conduct; wanton; lewd, debauched"; 5 or
"inimical to good order and contra bonos mores";6 or "any practice
the tendency of which, as shown by experience, is to weaken or
corrupt the morals of those who follow it"; 7 or "loosed from restraint, unashamed, lawless, loose in morals and conduct, recklessly
abandoned to sensual pleasures, profiligate, wanton, lewd, debauched".8 The terms are not confined to sexual misconduct. Orloff v. Los
1. Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 36 Cal. 2d 734, 740, 227 P.2d 449
(1951).

2. Id.
3. People v. Jaurequi, 142 Cal. App. 2d 555, 560, 298 P.2d 896 (2d Dist.
Ct. App., 1956).

4. People v. Diebert, 117 Cal. App. 2d 410, 417, 256 P.2d 355 (2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1953).

5. Id., 117 Cal. App. 2d at 419.
6. Id.

7. People v. Scott, 113 Cal. App. 778, 780, 296 P. 601 (App. Dept.,
Super. Ct., L.A. Co. 1931).
8. Id., 113 Cal. App. at 783.

See also People v. Babb, 103 Cal. App.

2d 326, 330, 229 P.2d 843 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1951).

Angeles Turf Club, 36 Cal. 2d 734, 746, 227 P.2d 449 (1951); In re
Daniel R, supra.
Many federal courts have recently held that similar language in
adult vagrancy statutes is unconstitutionally vague. Wheeler v.
Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D. No. Car. 1969) (3 Judge Court),
app. pend., Docket No. 102, 39 U.S.L.W. 3020 (U.S.S.C., Filed
3/3/70), held unconstitutional as vague a statute that proscribed
"leading an idle, immoral or profligate life". Baker v. Binder, 274
F. Supp. 658, 662 (W.D. Ky. 1967) (three-judge court), held unconstitutionally vague a Kentucky statute that specified conduct with
considerably more precision that is found in § 601. See also Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897, 905 (D. Colo. 1969) (three-judge
court) ("idle, immoral or profligate course of life" vague); Ricks
v. United States, 414 F.2d 1097, 1106-07 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("leading
an immoral and profligate life" vague).
Defendants would attempt to distinguish these cases by affixing
the label "civil" to § 601. But even if such a label was justified, 9
it would not dispose of the vagueness problem. It is clear from several decisions that vagueness may be a constitutional infirmity in
either criminal or civil statutes. In A. B. Small Co. v. American
Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233 (1925), the Supreme Court expressly rejected the criminal-civil distinction in holding void for
vagueness a statute which gave a defense to a contract action, 267
U.S. ,at 239. This holding was recently reaffirmed in Giaccio v.
Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966), which struck down a "civil"
statute which imposed costs on criminal defendants guilty of "some
misconduct". In Bonnie v. Gladden, 400 F.2d 547, 548 (1968), the
Ninth Circuit cited Giaccio as relevant to a district court's consideration on remand of a juvenile statute. See also Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951).
It is important, however, to note the seriousness of the deprivation of freedom possible under § 601. The more extensive the deprivation, the greater the due process requirement for certainty of
statutory language. See Jordan v. DeGeorge, supra; Winters v.
New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948). A child within the provisions
of § 601 may be adjudicated a "ward" of the juvenile court and be
committed to one of the juvenile homes or camps established by
the various counties. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 730 (West 1966).
The first effect of an adjudication under § 601 is the attachment
of social stigma. The § 601 child is denominated a ward, the same
term describing youths who violate criminal standards of conduct.
The juvenile court
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West 1966).
may maintain for at least five years a record that the child has
been adjudged a ward of the court. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §.781
(West 1966). Efforts to make such adjudications non-stigmatizing have been generally recognized as unavailing. In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 23-24 (1967).
9. The better view would seem to characterize the statute as "penal"
since it sanctions misconduct against the public order with deprivation of
liberty. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
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An adjudication of wardship under § 601 may also lead to deprivation of freedom. Juvenile homes or camps are admittedly "lowsecurity" institutions that attempt to maintain a rehabilitative,
home-like atmosphere. However, an escape from such an institution can lead to a commitment to one of the medium-security institutions of the Youth Authority. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 602,
731 (West 1966). Nor does the rehabilitative ideal distinguish the
juvenile homes and camps from the Youth Authority institutions,
nor indeed from modern adult penal institutions. See id. at § 1251.
Wards under § 601 may be placed in direct contact with wards committed for conduct amounting to a crime under § 602. See id. §§ 506,
508, 730, 731. Wards may be required to do physical labor on
grounds maintenance and fire prevention, and may even be required to participate in fire fighting, activity of such obvious danger
that the state has a special statute extending workmen's compensation benefits for injury or death arising therefrom. CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 883 (as amended 1967) (West Supp. 1970). Compensation for such labor is completely within the discretion of county
boards of supervisors. Id. § 884. Commitment to such homes and
camps may extend until the ward becomes 21 or for two years after
adjudication (whichever is longer).
Defendants cannot adequately distinguish the cases, noted above,
which struck down adult vagrancy statutes. The language in § 601
is equally vague as that considered unconstitutional in those cases.
Indeed, in several of those statutes, the same terms appear as are
found in § 601. Nor, as we have indicated, are the cases distinguishable by the "civil" label, nor by the level of deprivation of liberty. 10
But in addition to this lack of adequate distinctions, this Court has
positive reasons for following these cases."
It is recognized that
10. Nor does the fact that the persons regulated here are minors
sufficiently distinguish those cases dealing with adult crime. Some subject matters of regulation are less amenable to precision than others.
See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 520, 524-25 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.
dissenting). But we do not see why the state cannot specify the conduct
which it wishes to take as a ground for initiating its rehabilitative efforts. The state has had over 50 years of experience with the juvenile
court system and should by now be able to give fair warning of the con-

duct which it wishes to single out for treatment in confining state institutions.
11. This Court is aware that the decision of Mattiello v. Connecticut,
395 U.S. 209 (1969), dismissing appeal for want of a properly presented
federal question, 4 Conn. Cir. 55, 225 A.2d 507 (App. Div. 1966), was an
adjudication on the merits. We cannot determine, however, from the short
per curiam opinion whether the holding was dictated by vagueness doctrine or whether the appeal was dismissed because the sentence under
the challenged statute ran concurrently with a conviction not challenged.
See Brief of Appellee 4-6, Mattiello v. Connecticut, supra, citing United
States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 138 (1965). Even if the Court reached the

a central infirmity of a vague statute is that its vagueness makes
other due process guarantees meaningless. See generally, Note, The
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 67 (1960).
Since the Supreme Court has in recent years defined certain due process guarantees attaching to juvenile proceedings, the question
of vagueness may be analyzed in light of those
12
guarantees.
A juvenile facing a § 601 adjudication is guaranteed rights to
hearing, to counsel, to notice, to confrontation and to freedom from
self-incrimination. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); CAL. WELF.

& INST. CODE

§§ 625, 634, 679

(as amended 1967) (West Supp. 1970). The effect of a vague statute
on such rights was the crucial point in the decision of Giaccio v.
Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966). In holding unconstitutional a
statute imposing costs of prosecution upon a criminal defendant
guilty of "some misconduct", Mr. Justice Black spoke for the Court:
It would be difficult if not impossible for a person to prepare a
defense against such general abstract charges as "misconduct" or
"reprehensible misconduct".

382 U.S. at 404. It is no easier to defend against charges that one is
"in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral life". Of
what possible utility is notice of charges when the charge is merely
that one is "dissolute"? What use is counsel when it is impossible
to know what type of evidence is relevant to rebuttal of the prosecution case?
It is also important to consider that the Supreme Court held in
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (March 31, 1970), that a juvenile is entitled to the "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, at least
when charged with conduct amounting to an adult crime. Without
holding that the Winship standard is applicable to § 601 adjudications, we note that the vagueness of § 601 gives the state an easy
escape from its requirements. According to a statement by Defendant Cahill, then Chief of Police, San Francisco Police Department, the police ordinarily act with respect to a minor only where
there is a report or observation of a crime. See Answers to Intervagueness question, it is difficult without opinion to determine whether
the Court accepted Connecticut's assertion that the statute was limited to
continuing courses of conduct, which, of course, would make the statute

less open to challenge.

Note also that Mattiello preceded Winship,

which plays a part in our decision here.
12. Plaintiffs argue that the breadth of the statute creates a danger
that the exercise of free speech would lead to a § 601 adjudication on the
basis that such speech might show an "inconsiderate attitude toward good
order". Compare Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 36 Cal. 2d 734, 746,
227 P.2d 449 (1951), with Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969). But absent any indication that the state courts would consider such protected speech as constituting a violation of § 601, or in
upholding an arrest under that section, we prefer to rest our holding on
the grounds that the indeterminateness of this statutory language would
negate the important procedural rights attaching to an adjudication under
§ 601.

[VOL. 1: 1, 1973]

Void Juvenile Statute
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

rogatories, No. 50 (filed April 14, 1969). Assuming this to be the
general practice, the possibilities for abuse are manifest. If the police or probation officers do not have sufficient proof to show commission of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt, they can change the
charge to § 601 and prove a potentially immoral conduct of life. A
similar practice was condemned in Ricks v. District of Columbia,
414 F.2d 1097, 1107-09 (D.C. Cir. 1968). With the § 601 charge, the
state can impose the same sanctions as on the "criminal" § 602, with
the single exception that the places of initial incarceration are
under the control of the county rather than the Youth Authority.
Even if the "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" standard were applied to § 601, the state would still have an effective route around
the requirements of Winship because § 601 defines the substance of
the offense so broadly that the procedural safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt becomes meaningless. Standards of proof
depend on standards of relevance and probativeness, and these are
precluded when the substantive offense covers the entire moral
dimension of one's life.
On the basis of the preceding analysis, the Court holds that the
portion of CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 (West 1966) which reads "or
who from any cause is in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd
or immoral life" is too vague to serve as a constitutionally permissible standard on which to base an arrest or an adjudication of a
juvenile as a ward of a court. We believe that this portion of the
statute is such that "men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." Connally v.
General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). It is violative of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'1
13. There are
juvenile may be
alternatives of §
The first would

three other bases, stated in the alternative, by which a
adjudged a ward under § 601. At least the first two
601 present serious vagueness problems in themselves.
sanction habitual disobedience of the "reasonable and

proper" orders of parents and school authorities. The second covers children who are "beyond the control of" their parents and school authorities.
The first section presents problems in its "reasonable and proper" lan-

guage; the second because its failure to specify a persistent lack of control might lead it to the same potential abuses that we have found possible
under the "idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral life" portion of § 601 by rea-

son of its application to the same type of single acts. But the parties have

not squarely presented the issues raised by these other portions of § 601,
and their own factual situation does not present an adequate case for consideration of these other portions, and we do not make a holding on them
today. Nor do we find the statute so "indivisible" that the whole must
fall with the part. See Decker v. Fillis, 306 F. Supp. 613, 617 (D. Utah
1969).
. In so holding, we neither decide nor imply that the legislature is impotent to provide for some form of protective custody for delinquent or

It Is Therefore Declared And Ordered:
1. That the portion of CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 (West 1966)
which reads "or who from any cause is in danger of leading an idle,
dissolute, lewd or immoral life" is unconstitutional; and
2. That enforcement, by arrest, adjudication or otherwise, of the
portion of CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601 referred to in paragraph
one, against the named plaintiffs, members of their class, or against
any other person, is hereby permanently enjoined.
Dated: February ,1971.
Is/ M. Oliver Koelsch, Circuit Judge
Is/ William T. Sweigert, District Judge
Is/ Stanley A. Weigel, District Judge
Original filed feb. 9, 1971,
Clerk, U.S. Dist. Court, San Francisco.

neglected juveniles, upon reasonably clear and definite standards, when it
may be necessary for their own protection or that of society or of both.

